I have been noticing that there are a number of problems in society. One is that there are lots of children who are being produced and not cared for. In many places around the world children are abandoned to living on the streets with no one to care for them, in other places orphanages require the dedication of scarce resources. I’ve also noticed that studies show that teenage girls raised in a single-parent household are more likely to become pregnant as a teenager. And boys raised by single-parents are more likely to have problems with aggression, attention deficit disorder, delinquency, school suspensions, and are more likely to end up in prison. I’ve also noticed that if a couple produces a child and then relationship ends, it places many burdens on the remaining parent as regards supporting and raising the child alone. We should do something about these heterosexuals producing all these problems! We need a way to prevent all these problems heterosexuals cause.
Therefore, I hereby introduce the modest proposal of “The Child Production Problem Prevention Pact.” All individuals who wish to form a natural reproductive unit with another individual are encouraged to join up for this pact. This institution will be designed to prevent the problems we have named. There are three obligations one takes on when signing up for the pact as there are three problems that result from the production of children. First, the couple vows not to abandon or mistreat any children that may result from their intercourse, and will provide for the material and emotional well-being of the child. Second, the couple vows not to abandon their partner to raise the child alone and suffer the problems therein. Third, the couple vows to society that they will not burden society with any child that may produce.
Eligibility: all couples who form a natural reproductive unit may join. A natural reproductive unit is a device created by God or natural selection with the function to produce offspring. It is the functioning of this unit that is causing all these problems and requires an institution by which to address them.
Question: I am infertile. Can I and my partner sign up? Yes, you still form a natural reproductive unit even if you are unable to perform that function. For example, in a liberal society the State does not have the right to prevent individuals from trying to be farmers even if they are unable to farm. A liberal State does is not in the business of saying who may join as a natural reproductive unit as it does not practice eugenics.
Question: We would like to join but have no intention of creating a child. Can we still join? Yes, functional items still have functions even if they do not perform that function. For example, even if there is never a fire and so the fire department never performs its function it still has the function of preventing fires.
Question: Can I join with a member of the same sex? No, you do not form a reproductive unit.
Question: Why can only reproductive units join? Becasue the state will be dispensing benefits to those who sign up and take on this function and it is unfair to provide these benefits to those who do not perform this function. For example, in order to join the police department you must possess a function relative to the prevention of breaking the law, such as being a police officer, or detective. In the case of marriage, sorry, I mean the Child Production Problem Prevention Pact, you must possess the function of producing children which is relevant to an institution designed to prevent the problems that result from the production of children. A same sex couple either possesses no function or a function unrelated to the production of children.
Question: But that is not fair to those who are attracted to the same sex.
Response: It is no more unfair than that a fireman may not join the police department, or, perhaps, that someone with cerebral palsy can not acquire the function of a linebacker and so can not join the football team.
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33 comments:
Yes it should be there. I like this kinds of pact. Thanks a lot for creating this concept.
keep posting variety of articles.
Smith ALan
I think there are several problems here.
First, there are times when spouses have very good reason to "abandon their partner to raise the child alone." Abuse is rampant, especially in certain cultures (sub-saharan tribal Africa, Taliban-controlled Islamic tribes, etc). Men and women should always have an "out" for themselves and their children when a spouse becomes abusive.
Second, the notion that a child might be a "burden" on society is so vague as to be meaningless.
Third, heterosexual couples with no intention to procreate can opt-in, but same-sex couples cannot. You legitimize this through the ridiculously sophistic notion that "functional items have functions even if they don't perform functions." Sorry, wrong by definition. Same-sex couples have as much to contribute to the cultural dialogue over raising children as any other couple, especially couples without biological children. If you think raising children is solely within the purview of the immediate "reproductive" spouses, you're missing the big picture. What's more, same-sex couples can adopt, or they can have children via in-vitro. "Reproductive unit" becomes a non sequitur here.
I completely agree with what you say about divorce.
By saying that a child can be a burden on society I basically have in mind historical and contemporary cities that experience the problem of large numbers of children abandoned to living on the streets. Or the case of children requiring resources through charity or by the state that should be provided by their parents.
Why do you have a problem with the notion that something might have a function but not perform it? There can be fire departments that never have to put out a fire, or simply a toaster that is never actually plugged in to make toast. But the fire department still has the function to fight fires and the toaster still has the function to make toast.
Gay couples that have children via in vitro still require sperm and eggs so there is still the natural reproductive unit.
The problem with your definition of the function of marriage is that people disagree widely regarding the function and meaning of marriage. Your idea of "function" is by no means an objective fact about a subjective relationship.
Human relationships typically have a variety of functions, and its common that not everyone involved, and not all observers, agree about those functions. Most people agree about the primary use of a toaster. However, most people diverge in opinion when you ask them to define the purpose or function of marriage. Some people would say that the function is as a contract to maintain fidelity, or a convention to make the relationship legitimate in the eyes of family, peers, the church, and/or the state, an agreement to love one another, a contract to allow one person legally to enter the United States, etc.
Only some people would agree that part of the function of a marriage is to produce children. Very few people would agree with you that a marriage isn't performing its function if offspring aren't produced. Under your premises, a couple that know they aren't fertile in advance cannot therefore have a real marriage. That's absurd.
Relationships are not toasters or fire departments.
I suggest you read my posts where I answer your concerns. See "The Function of Marriage": http://apoxonbothyourhouses.blogspot.com/2011/06/function-of-marriage.html
And "10 Answers to Arguments in Favor of Gay Marriage": http://apoxonbothyourhouses.blogspot.com/2011/06/10-answers-to-arguments-in-favor-of-gay.html
I've read both of those posts, and I think my criticism stands.
You think you have an objective definition of the function of marriage. But tell me this -- how does one go about proving whether one definition of the function of something is more objective than another definition?
Your answer to the criticism that people disagree about the function of marriage is that a function stands above agreement or disagreement. I think you're wrong about that. You use the example of a screwdriver. Yes, people generally agree about its function. But, if you were to drop a screwdriver into the middle of a primitive tribe that had never seen one, nor had any screws to screw, then they would find a different function for the screwdriver. (This principle is well-articulated in the movie "The Gods Must Be Crazy," about an African tribe's use of a discarded Coke bottle). So, while our culture has a good general agreement about the function of a screwdriver, that doesn't make the function "objective." It makes the function culturally
"intersubjective," but that's all.
Also, remember that human relationships are far more complex than screwdrivers, or even fire-departments. People approach marriage for many reasons. How do you justify your definiton of the function of the marriage act/ceremony/status/relationship over and above someone else's definition?
You presume objectivty where it doesn't exist. That's the problem with your critique, and that problem undermines your entire argument.
No. I have explained very clearly what a thing's function is and why it is no no way subjective or conventional. It does not matter what a primitive tribe uses a screwdriver for, its function is still to turn screws. Are you saying that because a primitive tribe doesn't know that the function of the heart is to pump blood then that is not its function in that tribe? There is a large literature dedicated to understanding the nature of function that you might be interested in. Basically, you can think of function as what something is selected for by evolution. Pumping blood is what hearts are selected for, attracting mates are what mating displays are selected for. And this is an entirely objective fact. And it applies to cases other than natural selection working on genes. All that is necessary is that some feature be copied between two items as a matter of natural law, and that the item be copied because it produces an effect. So for example the skin patterns on a chameleon have the function of matching what the chameleon sits on. The pattern is copied from the surface by the chameleons pigment arrangers, and the reason that it is copied is because it produces camouflage. That is its function, and this is just a matter of fact, and not culturally relative, etc. The same goes fro screwdrivers, they are copied from a prototype because they turn screws. That is their function and it is in no way culturally relative. The same goes for social institutions like the police, hospitals, schools, and yes marriage.
I should mention that this account of function is in no way mine, it is taken from the literature in philosophy of biology. It is Ruth Millikan's. I just have applied her account of function to marriage. I suggest you pick up a copy of Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories for the full account.
Category mistake. A marriage is not a biological process, system, or organ.
Tell me, is it possible for functions to change?
Biologically, is it possible that the function of feathers changed over time?
Culturally, is it possible that the function of religion has changed over time?
In terms of human relationships, like marriage, is it possible for the conventions of a relationship to change? For example, is it possible that Barbers used to perform the function of surgery and dentistry, and now they perform the function of cutting hair (and, perhaps, other activities, such as shaving -- or, with my barber and many barbers, placing bets on games).
Functions change and adapt in biology. In fact, we know that the functions of organs like bacterial flagellum and feathers change over time and sometimes endow organisms with evolutionary advantages as a result. In the Dover trial, this was demonstrated by a scientist who, when told that the function of a mousetrap was to catch mice, and needed every part to play a specific function in order to be useful, one scientist took the mousetrap apart and used the spring for a tie-tack.
Barbers are a great example of the way human institutions change as well. If, as you suggest, we pigheadedly stick to one "objective" definition of the function of an institution, then our barbers would still be bloodletting to cure disease. I for one am glad we allowed that institution to evolve.
Another good example is the black man. If we held to your idea about the absolute, objective function of an institution, then the purpose of the black man would still be to serve the white man. Thank goodness people changed their minds about that one.
Human institutions change, evolve, fade away, and adapt over time. Their functions change, too.
You have no grounds for deciding which function is essential to marriage and which isn't. I can just as easily argue that the function of marriage is to unite two people in love and to exchange promises of fidelity. In fact, I would argue that my definition is closer to the modern function of marriage as most people see it. And that definition of function would certainly allow people who can't have kids or don't intend to have kids to enjoy the rights, responsibilities, and joy of marriage all the same.
In America, the most recent poll numbers indicate that the majority agrees with me on that point. And, since marriage is an institution whose purpose, customs, and function slowly changes with people's beliefs, it looks like the clock is ticking on your antiquated ideas.
Not a category mistake: marriage is a social institution like the police department, hospitals, and schools. It is a set of behaviors performed by two or more people because these behaviors have historically had a result such as preventing crime, healing the sick, or educating children. The function of marriage is to prevent the problems that result from the production of children.
It is possible for things to change their functions (but not for functions to change). More accurately, it is possible for an items ancestors to change their function as they are selected for their ability to perform some new feat. As with other functional items, social institutions can drift from their original purpose. In the case of functional items such as hearts or human artifacts, this change in function is accomplished by a change in physical structure; the properties of the item will change as it is reproduced and selected for its ability to accomplish some new feat. In the case of human languages and institutions, the drift can often be difficult to discern because it occurs gradually and because there is not the obvious change in physical structure as there is in organs and artifacts (Millikan 1984: 32). In the case of institutions, a change in function will be accompanied by new behaviors, bureaucracies, obligations, and the like. For example, imagine a police department which has become corrupt and no longer enforces the law. Instead, it just seeks to procure for its members certain benefits such as respect and financial rewards. Even though this police department no longer enforces the law, enforcement of the law remains its function, although the institution currently fails to perform it. It remains its function because the selection criterion for the possession of a function has not yet been met. If the community gets fed up with this corrupt police department and start up a new institution whose function is to enforce the law, or a split occurs within the force whereby a faction returns to its original function, then the competition between the two institutions will result in a selection process in which one part of the split will cease to have law enforcement as its function and will now have the production of those benefits for it members as its function. The selection criterion for an etiological function has now been met and the other half of the split once again has the function to enforce the law.
Something similar has occurred in recent decades as concerns marriage. This has occurred for various historical reasons too complex to discuss here. As happens when institutions drift away or change their function, this change has occurred with the altering of the behaviors, obligations, and attitudes it traditionally displayed. The institution going by the name of marriage, like the police department in the preceding example, has drifted away from its function until it has none of the obligations designed to ensure the performance of the function of marriage. Whereas marriage carries the obligation to ones child to stay to raise them well, advocates of this new institution claim that marriage entails no connection to the upbringing of children. Secondly, whereas marriage contains an obligation to ones spouse not to abandon them to raise the child alone, this new institution contains no such obligation to remain in it any longer than one wishes. Thirdly, whereas marriage is an obligation to the community, and the community has an interest in the success or failure of the institution, this new institution is no ones business but the couple involved. Finally, whereas marriage is reproduced for its ability to prevent problems that result from heterosexual intercourse, this new institution is reproduced to promote the happiness of the individual adults involved and may be ended when this happiness fades.
It is this modern arrangement that is the blueprint from which homosexual “marriages” seek to be reproduced. In claiming that marriage has no connection to reproduction, the advocates of gay marriage make explicit the fact that the institution in which they are claiming a right to membership has a different function from an institution designed to prevent problems that result from reproduction. In doing so they have forced a split in the institution such as described in the police department example above. One branch of this split now makes explicit that the function of the institution no longer has anything to do with reproduction, the other branch wishes to return the institution to performing its original function. Homosexual unions are not reproduced from those instances that actually performed the function of preventing the problems that result from producing a child. Instead they are modeled on an institution that claims that marriage is a consensual agreement between two adults to further their individual happiness and share certain property rights and so on.
This is not to say that the recurring problems of property disputes, hospital visitation rights, and so on might not need an institution designed to resolve these issues, only that--as its defenders do in fact claim--this new institution has a different function from one that has the prevention of the problems resulting from heterosexual intercourse as its function. As a matter of fact, I do not think that there is a need for a new social institution as there already exists procedures such as power of attorney in which these issues may be resolved.
That being said, there are good reasons for restricting the name “marriage” to the traditional arrangement. The main reason is that this is what has historically been called marriage. Words spread based largely by the weight of precedent, and the precedent in this case is to reserve the name “marriage” to the union of a man and a woman. A Kripkean baptism occurred many centuries ago for this arrangement and that gives it a claim to the name. In our previous example of the corrupt police department, when the split occurs whereby a faction wishes to return to performing the original function, it seems to me that it is this institution that should retain the name of police.
Correction: When I wrote "More accurately, it is possible for an items ancestors to change their function as they are selected for their ability to perform some new feat," "ancestors" should of course read "descendants."
You fail adequately to take into account 1) the radical differences historically and culturally in the definition of marriage, 2) the inevitable evolution of institutions in light of the changing needs, values, and societal arrangements in a given culture, and 3) the level of subjectivity in definitions of "function" related to nearly all human convention.
The function of the internet is to ease long-distance communication between institutions for the purposes of advanced research.
While of course there have been many usurpations of this function by people, corporations, and other organizations world-wide, this function remains true because it is beyond the agreement or disagreement of the public. It is an objective definition.
A screwdriver has a function of twisting screws. While other people can try to use it for other purposes, that doesn't mean that its function changes. So, while people may try to use the internet for functions different than advanced research, that doesn't change the function of the internet.
Therefore, only those doing advanced research can appropriately use the internet. People who are blogging to express political opinions or commentary are not doing advanced research.
Therefore, Empedocles' blog does not have a legitimate presence on the internet.
Marriage is different in different times and places as people have different practices as to what arrangement may best perform its function. In some cultures the parents choose marriage partners, in others the individuals involved do. I'm agnostic as to which is better; they both probably have plusses and minuses. But likewise, the police department has been organized differently in different times and places. That doesn't mean its function was not to prevent crime.
Institutions may indeed evolve, as I mentioned in the police department example. They may even evolve so much that the original problem they were meant to address is no longer being addressed. They also may fracture or go extinct.
As I mentioned in the corrupt police department example, when the split occurs whereby one faction wishes to return to enforcing the law, it retains that function. But the other side of the split then gets the function of procuring respect and financial rewards for its members. (In this example, this branch will probably soon go extinct.) It is the selection process between these two factions which determines what they are selected for their ability to do and so what their function is.
This same dynamic may very well play out in the marriage debate where a split occurs where in the end one side has the function to prevent problems from the production of children, and the other side has the sharing of property and so on as its function (I would bet that this branch would likewise go extinct, but maybe not). I think that the debate occurring right now is the selection process by which this plays out. Perhaps the institution with the function to prevent the problems that result from the production of children will go extinct as a result. But I doubt it as generally, if there is a recurring problem, such as crime, or the production of children, you can expect an institution to remain or spring up to address it. But this isn't inevitable, it is always possible that the problem may simply go unaddressed.
Then the debate is over which side of the split to call "marriage." This is a mere verbal dispute and makes no real difference. (As I mentioned I think that there is good reason to retain "marriage" for the traditional arrangement just as you would retain the name "police" for an institution that enforces the law.) So forget about the word "marriage" for a minute. That is why I rather tongue-in-cheekly came up with the child production problem prevention pact. The problems that result from the production of a child are real and recurring and society desperately needs an institution by which to address these problems. We can call it marriage, schmarriage, or whatever, but that doesn't make the problems go away, or the need for an institution by which to help prevent them. Maybe to make everyone happy neither side will get to use "marriage" and we can come up with something new for each. I'll even call it the "Rob S memorial cooperative child production institution" if you want.
You are showing so much interest in the nature of function, I can recommend "The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology" by Mark Perlman as a good summary of the various positions and debates in the literature. A free version is online at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1364/is_1_87/ai_n29112178/
"The institution of raising children" is neither a necessary nor a sufficient definition of "the function" of marriage. It might be one function in some marriages, but it is not a necessary function for every marriage.
You keep talking around the point. What would it take to "prove" the necessary definition of the function of marriage?
History isn't on your side. Very few, if any, cultures have held child-rearing as a requisite dimension of marriage. Some cultures, including our own, have allowed same-sex partners to be married. Almost no cultures have disallowed the infertile to marry. Consequently, one cannot determine the function of marriage to be constrained by the child-rearing process.
Your definition simply has no historical or sociological validity.
In one of my other posts on the subject I address this issue. Infertile or celibate couples still form a unit with the function to produce children, whether or not they currently can or do. It is similar to how a device like a toaster still has the function of making toast even it it is broken or never used to make toast. Or like a police department that either can not or does not catch criminals; it is still its function to do so.
If I had a child and they turned out gay I would not feel at all bad about them not being able to marry any more than I would feel bad that they could not be admitted to the police department if they were firemen, or maybe that they would not need an inoculation if they were immune to malaria, that they don't need an umbrella if it is not raining, or that they could not be a linebacker if they had cerebral palsy. Nor do I think being gay is immoral.
Also, to follow up on my previous comment, even though I think it would be unfair as it violates the way that names attach to functional items, I wouldn't even be against calling a gay union "marriage" as long as there is another institution with the function to prevent the problems that result from the production of children.
Once again, you're not addressing the issue.
How do you determine what the defining function of an institution is?
You're deciding the function of marriage by fiat. You have no historical or sociological justification for your definition of the function of marriage.
This criticism is devastating to your entire argument.
How often do I need to explain that an items's function is determined by its history of selection and reproduction? That is an objective fact of the matter. Do you accept that the function of a heart is to pump blood? That the function of a mating display is to attract mates? that the function of a screwdriver is to turn screws? That the function of the police department is to enforce the law?
Next time you hear a report that girls who grow up in single parent households are more likely to become pregnant as teenagers, or that boys raised by single-parents are more likely to have problems with aggression, attention deficit disorder, delinquency, school suspensions, and are more likely to end up in prison, or that a city has a problem with homeless children, or orphanages are struggling with funding, say to yourself, gee, shouldn't there be an institution whereby the parents agree to raise the child together so as to prevent all of these problems? I wonder what such an institution would look like...
Plus, suppose I claim that I am married because I make ice cream and the function of marriage is to make ice cream. Therefore I should be able to claim married status on my taxes and receive the tax benefits married couples make. After all, the function of marriage is entirely subjective and no one is right or wrong about it. So I guess anyone who claims they are married no matter what should be considered married.
You claim that “an item’s function is determined by its history of selection and reproduction.” Even though this is arguable, I'm going to assume you're correct for the purposes of moving forward and showing the insufficiency of your argument.
1. Marriage is not an “item.” Again, category mistake.
2. By your own definition, the function of marriage is determined by its history and “reproduction.” I have continually challenged you to refer to the history of marriage. You continually fail to do so. So you don’t create sufficient evidence for your argument by the merits of your own definition.
3. I don’t know what “history of reproduction” would mean with regard to marriage. That phrase is clearly problematic because, again, you’re making a category mistake and assuming marriages are like biological organs. But, to give you the benefit of the doubt, I’ll assume you mean the sociology of the convention of marriage as it is “reproduced” – chosen over and over again to be used (like a meme) – in a culture. I have continually challenged you to refer to the sociology of marriage, which would explain those cultural choices. You continually fail to do so. Once again, your argument fails by the standards of your own definition.
4. The examples you continually use do not exhaust the various possibilities of functions, not even within the limited categories you choose.
4A) Yes, the function of a heart is to pump blood. We know this through scientific discovery. We do not determine the functions of marriages by means of scientific evidence or discovery. But, to continue -- with some organs, the function is a constant. With others, the history of reproduction changes the function, as with feathers and bacterial flagellum. So, as I have argued, functions can change over time. This gets us back to #2 and #3, which require you to show that the function of marriage was historically to take care of children and did not change over time. You have not provided such evidence.
4B) Yes, the purpose of a mating display is to attract mates. This is a behavior. Marriage is not a behavior. Further, mating displays among humans can serve a variety of functions. For example, a man may write a poem to impress a woman, and we might call that a human mating display. But there are also many other possible functions for the poem. He may also have written it to achieve some level of fame with other people, to express an idea, to understand his own emotions, to get a grade for a class, to earn a few dollars, to compete with a friend who is also a writer, etc. There may be a multiplicity of functions of the poem. Also, the poem would still be a poem even if it were not a mating display, or if the purpose as the display was lost or became irrelevant over time. Marriage is much the same way. Two people may get together partly to have children, but also for other reasons. They may end up not having children, but that doesn't mean they're no longer legitimately married. The function of having children is not the necessary or sufficient condition for the relationship to be called a marriage, just as the mating display is not the necessary or sufficient condition for the writing to be called a poem.
4C) Yes, the function of a screwdriver, which is a man-made object, is sometimes to screw screws. We know this because a person or small group of persons invented the screwdriver for a specific function. So we have the invention of an object, and we clearly know the original intention of the inventor. Marriage is not a man-made object. We may not know the intentions of the original inventor of marriage. This gets us back to #2 again. You have failed to provide evidence that the intention of the inventor(s) of marriage -- if ever there were one -- was solely to provide for children.
4D) Yes, the function of a police department is to enforce the law. A police department is an organization designed for a singular purpose. The purposes of the police department have grown to include community outreach, paramedic and emergency responses, traffic detail, and so on. Organizations change over time. A marriage is not an organization, however. We do not know that marriage was originally created solely to rear children like we know that police departments were organized to enforce the law. This is again, why I refer to #2. You fail to provide evidence that about the original intention of marriage.
5. You claim that societies have problems with raising children. I agree. You claims that children without a male and female parent are more likely to have various problems. I agree.
Does that mean that the function of marriage is to raise children? No. In some cultures, such as the Jewish Kibbitzum, the raising of children had nothing to do with marriage, but was rather a communal affair. The Oneida community in New York had a eugenics program and raised children communally as well. Certainly we can easily imagine that children do not have to be raised with the confines of a marriage. Rearing children is neither necessary for marriage, nor is marriage necessary for rearing children. It might be preferable, sure. But does that constrain marriage to the child-rearing function alone? Absolutely not.
This is evidenced all through the history of marriage. In early Germanic cultures, marriage was a sale between a bridegroom and the bride's father. The function was a political one. Same sex marriages were recognized by the state in ancient China during the Ming Dynasty, in Ancient Rome, 11th-Century Spain, and so on. Those marriages obviously required no children to be birthed or reared.
Again, you don't have history on your side, and you yourself recognize history as a seminal element in the definition and determination of the function of something.
Even if you did, however, you'd still be on shaky grounds. Look, for example, at my definition of the function of the internet. I can show by historical analysis that the internet was originally developed for the exchange of scientific information. Does that mean that your blog is illegitimate and should not be on the internet because it doesn't exchange scientific information? Absolutely not? Why? Because organizations (and conventions like marriage) change over time. Obviously the convention of marriage has changed over time to include a variety of functions, only one of which might be child-rearing.
You set up a ridiculous straw-man against marriages based upon ice-cream. But I don't see any problem with two people getting married because they share a love of making ice-cream. I think the function of marriage is an agreement between two consenting adults for purposes of their own determination. This looser definition has gained ground over the years, and is much closer to the function of marriage than is your own ungrounded, unhistorical, indefensible version of marriage.
Back to respond to your points.
A. Some items produce an effect that causes the item to be selected for reproduction. If you don't believe this I don't know what to tell you, take it up with Darwin as he's the first to notice it.
B. In the literature on functions (which you really should read as I think it will be a great benefit) this specific natural phenomena of things being copied because they have produced an effect is called the item's function, or proper function, or etiological function, or teleofunction. If you don't like any of these names I'll be happy to call it whatever you want, I’ll even call it a hot fudge sundae with a cherry on top.
C. A feature of an item is a reproduction in this sense if the presence of that feature is the result of the workings of natural law such that had a previous item (the ancestor) been different in that respect the other item (the descendent) would differ accordingly (Millikan 1984: 19, Godfrey-Smith 1994: 456). Picture the way the color patterns of a chameleon’s skin match the surface upon which it sits. If the surface had been a different color, the chameleon’s skin would differ accordingly (assuming the chameleon’s pigment arrangers are working as designed). Further examples are the way that the characters on the paper that come out of a photocopier correspond in shape to the characters that are on the originals, or the way that children’s genes are copies of their parents’ genes (Millikan 1984: 23).
D. Items other than genes and their biological products may have functions as the theory merely requires that the reproductively established character to have been selected for reproduction because it has correlated with some effect more positively than items lacking this feature. Millikan, for example, claims that the imperative and indicative linguistic moods possess the functions to produce behavior and to produce true beliefs respectively (1984: ch. 3). Likewise, a learned behavior can have a function if it is reproduced because it leads to a reward; it being the function of the behavior to bring about this result (1984: 28), and a manufactured good such as a screwdriver can have turning screws as its function since it is this ability that has lead to the selection and reproduction of screwdrivers in manufacturing.
E. Social institutions thus may have functions as well. Suppose a town has grown large enough to require a police department. It is likely that this new institution will be produced by the townspeople on the model of previous departments existing in other towns. Thus the reproduction requirement for the possession of an etiological function is met. The selection requirement will be met in that the reason features of previous police departments will be copied is because they have historically proven to be an effective method of preventing crime. Examples are the sending out of officers on patrol, training programs for prospective officers, systems of rank among members of the force, the provision for a place to incarcerate suspects, and so on. Since these features are selected for reproduction because of their historical ability to prevent crime sufficiently often, that is their function.
F. In general, functional social institutions spring up wherever there is a recurring social problem in need of a solution: children to be educated in schools, the sick to be healed in hospitals, crime to be prevented with police, etc. In the case of biological items or artifacts, the reproductively established character of the item is a property; it is that a hammer’s hardness, shape, and resiliency are able to produce the effect of driving nails that these properties are copied in the process of manufacture. In the case of social institutions, it is not properties but behaviors that are reproduced for their effect of preventing or solving the problem in question. Police officers repeat the behaviors of going out on patrol, apprehending suspects, and the like. These repeated behaviors are the duties or obligations of the institution.
G. Producing children produces problems. There are three kinds of problems that may result from the production of children: problems the child itself may suffer, problems the parent or parents may suffer, and problems society as a whole may suffer. Examples of the first are the harm to a child’s physical and emotional health that may result in some situations. As mentioned, teenage girls raised in a single-parent household are more likely to become pregnant as a teenager. Boys raised by single-parents are more likely to have problems with aggression, attention deficit disorder, delinquency, school suspensions, and are more likely to end up in prison. Examples of the second type of problem are the lack of time and resources that a single-parent may face, or the emotional stress that may result from attempting to raise a child alone. An example of the third kind is the phenomena of children abandoned to living on the streets. Societies both contemporary and historically have experienced this problem and suffered the attendant social ills this produces.
H. There are several institutions by which society addresses these problems such as orphanages, or adoptions, or a kibbutz (as you point out). These all have their own character and their own functions as they are ways of dealing with specific problems in specific ways. For example, an orphanage is a functional institution that is reproduced for its ability to provide care for children when no other means of support can be found. They are the last line of defense before abandoning the child to the streets. However, orphanages have their own problems which commonly result in them being deemed a less than optimal solutions. Some studies show that children raised in orphanages are susceptible to lower intellectual and emotional development as compared to those not raised in orphanages (google it). Furthermore, the need for an orphanage shifts the burden and costs of rearing children onto society at large as orphanages require funding which is provided either voluntarily through charity, or involuntarily through taxation. Both of these solutions are less than ideal if a way could be found for others to raise the child voluntarily and without the need for external sources of funding.
I. One way of preventing these problems is for the biological parents to raise the child themselves. This specific solution to this specific problem is what I am calling marriage. Again, if you don’t like this name I have offered others such as schmarriage the child production problem prevention pact, or a banana split. It doesn’t matter to me what it is called as that is merely a verbal dispute. (I do think though that this violates the “rules” of how names attach to functional institutions, but I’ll let it slide for the sake of argument.)
I will try to get to your points one by one when I get some time. I didn't get to your internet example as I thought you were just joking and not serious and were just sticking it to me in a funny way. The internet is not an institution, it is an artifact. You don't join the Internet anymore than you join a toaster. However, there probably is something like the internet standards board which allows certain members and disallows others based on function. Computer scientists, programmers, internet businesses and so on are probably allowed, but a fireman, or taxi driver, or doctor are probably excluded since their function is not relevant to the function of the internet standard board.
First of all, you need to understand that I have extensive formal education in philosophy, biology, and in teleology. I've taken graduate courses on teleological conceptions of ethics, and I've written formal academic works on Aristotle's conception of teleology as it relates to ethics and metaphysics. I've read Millikan and Godfrey-Smith. So I know enough to see through the category mistakes you're making by talking ad nauseum about biological functions and mistakenly proffering analogy as argument. So you can drop the condescension.
Furthermore, you fail to understand that not all social institutions arise due to problems or perceived social ills. Recreational soccer leagues, for example, arise due to a desire for sport. People form book clubs out of a basic human curiosity. And so on. Marriage is the same way. It did not arise solely out of the solution to a problem. It also arose out of natural human desires for acceptance, love, partnership, parenting, safety, friendship, and the pooling of resources as well. Consequently, it has many functions.
Does the existence of children present problems, yes. I agree with you there. I even agree with you that marriage and the nuclear family is one -- even arguably the best -- solution to this problem. Does that limit marriage to the child-rearing act? By no one's definition but your own. You choose to call it marriage, but you're the one who should choose a different name, because you're in the minority position, and you've failed to show a consistent teleological argument grounded in historical precedent for your own definition that would justify a rejection of the majority view. The majority of adults in industrialized western countries disagree with you regarding the purposes and function of marriage. You also fail to put forth the historical and sociological evidence necessary to your own definition of function, and so I see no reason why we should prefer yours over the current cultural consensus.
I find it ridiculous that you offer up examples regarding screwdrivers, hearts, and police departments as definitive, but then brush off my very relevant example of the internet as if it were sacrosanct. In fact, it's a better analogy because I'm explicit about using it as such. You seem to think an analogy constitutes sufficient proof.
I'd just like to reiterate that I addressed your own definition of function, and called on you to put forth the historical evidence you think establishes marriage as limited to one function. But, yet again, you fail to do so. I'm tired of your treatises on chameleons and natural selection (yes, I've read Darwin. Yes, I've done graduate work in biology. Yes, I accept natural selection.) I don't think you understand enough about teleology to know what constitutes a proof of function for a social institution. Certainly your writing so far fails by its own definition to prove much of anything but that you like to dress up bigotry with sophisticated smoke screens.
If you had read Millikan and Godfrey-Smith you shouldn't have needed to ask "how does one go about proving whether one definition of the function of something is more objective than another definition?" or "Your answer to the criticism that people disagree about the function of marriage is that a function stands above agreement or disagreement. I think you're wrong about that" or "if you were to drop a screwdriver into the middle of a primitive tribe that had never seen one, nor had any screws to screw, then they would find a different function for the screwdriver" or asked "is it possible for functions to change?" or " If we held to your idea about the absolute, objective function of an institution, then the purpose of the black man would still be to serve the white man" or " You claim that “an item’s function is determined by its history of selection and reproduction.” Even though this is arguable, I'm going to assume you're correct for the purposes of moving forward." You would have understood the answers to these questions.
Also, if you had read Millikan you would understand the difference between a direct and derived function which your examples conflate.
I'm not offering an argument by analogy, although I use examples to illustrate my point. I'm using a theory about what it takes to have a function, then concluding that given this theory, certain social institutions have functions. That is not an argument by analogy. But I will then show how this works in other institutions to show how it works in marriage since the same principles apply.
I never claimed that ALL social institutions arise due to problems or perceived social ills. However, the examples I've used of police, hospitals, orphanages, and schools do.
I've volunteered to use a different name over an over, geez, the name of the post was The Child production Problem Prevention Pact. Although, again, I think that this goes against the ways that names attach to functional institutions. You say that I should choose a different name because I'm in the minority (that's debatable). I wasn't under the impression that that is the way that names get attached to objects. I was under the impression that Kripke's causal naming chains was far more the accepted way.
Your Internet example was absurd in its confusion of artifacts and institutions.
If you'd like proof of my credentials, you can talk to Professor Arnhart at his Darwinian Conservatism blog. You've posted there before. I was a grad student, and he guided some of my work in Aristotelian teleology.
I suggest you take some courses in biology, philosophy, and sociology as well. Your discourse is sophomoric enough that it could use the improvement. I'm done giving attention to this useless blog. It doesn't deserve the hits.
Well, I'm going to press on as we seem to be making progress. Originally you were saying that to say that "functional items have functions even if they don't perform [their] functions" was "ridiculously sophistic." Now you seem to have accepted the etiological account of function that explains this. Originally you were saying "if you were to drop a screwdriver into the middle of a primitive tribe that had never seen one, nor had any screws to screw, then they would find a different function for the screwdriver." Now you say "A screwdriver has a function of twisting screws. While other people can try to use it for other purposes, that doesn't mean that its function changes." Originally you were saying "how does one go about proving whether one definition of the function of something is more objective than another definition?" Now you're saying "Yes, the function of a heart is to pump blood" and "Yes, the purpose of a mating display is to attract mates." Originally you were saying "How do you determine what the defining function of an institution is?" now you're saying "Yes, the function of a police department is to enforce the law." Originally you were saying that "a child might be a "burden" on society is so vague as to be meaningless." Now you're saying "Does the existence of children present problems, yes. I agree with you there." So we don't have too much further to go. When I get some time, hopefully tomorrow, I'll get into the difference between a derived and direct function and hopefully address some of your remaining issues.
But really you're ignoring your most promising line of attack. Why not just say, even if there is an institution to prevent the problems that result from marriage, why can't a homosexual couple join it the way an infertile one can?
I'm going to finish the argument of this thread for the sake of any future internet archaeologist who may unearth it. The remaining issue is, given an institution with the function to prevent the problems that result from the production of children (whatever you want to call it), who may be admitted to it?
There is a three phase process wherein candidates are admitted to or denied membership in a functional institution. Firstly, prospective members must possess an institution-relative function. As we have seen, some functions are acquired through nature and some by human behavior. A case of the former is nature’s assignment of the function of pumping blood to the heart, or of producing children to male/female pairs. In the latter case, prospective members of an institution often, but not always, obtain their function from training institutions or schools. Schools produce citizens, doctors, and scholars, police academies produce police officers, armed forces boot camps produce soldiers, and so on. These vocations are all typed by function. In these cases, after graduation the individual is deemed to possess the relevant function and they then go on to perform the function they have acquired in the field they have chosen.
A function is institution-relative if it contributes to the performance of the greater institutional function. For example, prospective police officers undergo training at an academy in order to come to possess the function of police officer. The function of police officer is relative to the institution of a police department, and contributes to the institutional function of enforcing the law.
Secondly, when titles, rights and benefits are distributed based on function, it is necessary to be able to tell what that function is, when it is being performed, and to distinguish it from other functions. Discerning the function of an institution and its members, and the behaviors that achieve it is the job of what I will call the “describer.” For example, in a business, the human resources department often needs to distinguish the various positions from one another. In placing an advertisement for a position, the department will describe the position, its function, the reproductively established behaviors of the function that will be expected, and the requirements or virtues one must possess in order to perform these behaviors. This occurs because the business will be dispensing benefits such as a salary to those performing this function, and so it needs to be able to distinguish this role from those not performing the function (or performing some different function) so that the former but not the latter receive the appropriate benefits.
For example, if an engineer attempts to apply for a computer programmer position he may be justifiably excluded from the position and no unjust discrimination has occurred.
The third step is the selection phase. As its name implies, in this phase the acceptable candidates for the role are selected. In the business example, the selection role will be played by someone such as a hiring manager who decides whom to accept to the position as described by the describer. (Sometimes both roles may be played by the same individual.) It is just for the selector to exclude someone from taking on the position if they lack the virtues the position requires. For example, the candidate for a computer programmer position has selected which business he wishes to join, and the hiring manager selects whether or not they wish to accept the candidate. The candidate can be justly rejected for the position if they can not program computers, or can not program them as well as some other candidate, and they can not then claim unjust discrimination or a violation of equal protection of the law.
As regards the State, in a liberal society the State is not permitted to prevent an individual from attempting to take on a functional role. The State can not stop someone from aspiring to be a farmer, even if they are incapable of farming well, for example. On the other hand, in totalitarian societies, such as the one described by Plato in The Republic, the State does select and assign individuals to certain institutions. Perhaps someone who is a bad farmer would be unwise to try to perform that function, but in this example, the individual is taking on both the role of farmer and the role of selector and so he can not be prevented from doing so by the State. But if he was looking to be hired to farm by someone else, and was unable to perform that function, he could justifiably be denied that position by the selector.
In the case of marriage, it is nature which assigns function and determines who forms a natural reproductive unit and so possesses the institution-relative function of producing offspring. A homosexual pair either has no function or some function other than the production of children. In modern Western societies, the State has taken on the role of describer (although the Church continues to play it as well). It is necessary that it does so as the State bestows certain benefits on marriages, and so it needs to be able to describe what marriage is so as to prevent non-members or those with some other function from receiving those benefits. In so doing, the State is justified in preventing those who do not possess an institution-relevant function from joining the institution in question. If, for example, the State has a program of tax cuts in place for farmers, it is just to prevent blacksmiths and other non-farmers from claiming to be farmers and receiving that benefit.
Finally, as regards the selection phase, in modern Western societies this step is performed by the individuals involved. Traditionally, it was the parents who performed the selection of marriage partners for their children, and this still occurs in many cultures around the world. And in a State that practices eugenics, the State plays the selector role for marriage. But even though in modern Western societies it is the individuals who perform the selection role, the State, as the describer, is still justified in denying those without a relevant function from claiming membership (and the benefits that such membership bestows) in the institution.
To say that the State needs to describe marriage is not to say that marriage is merely conventional, or “socially constructed” by the State. Society or the State can no more construct the function of marriage than it can construct the function of the heart or liver. Like the biological examples, the function of marriage is entirely real and objective. However, the State does need to understand its nature because it distributes benefits to participants in that institution based on its beneficial effects, and so the State needs to be able to understand and distinguish that institution from others which do not perform its function.
The conclusion is that since homosexual relationships do not and can not have a function relative to the production of children, the State is justified in preventing homosexual couples from entering the institution of marriage. It is no more unjust to do so than it is to prevent a fireman from being accepted into a police department, or perhaps that someone with cerebral palsy can not acquire the function of a linebacker and so may be denied acceptance to a football team. Indeed, justice demands it insofar as the State will be providing resources to those participating in the institution of marriage because of the specific benefit this institution bestows to society. That nature, for whatever reason, has set the object of sexual attraction to be of the same sex makes no difference. As mentioned previously, if the State was offering a tax benefit to farmers and an individual was claiming this tax break but was not a farmer, the State could justifiably deny the title of farmer and the benefits provided to farmers to that individual. As applies to our current case, homosexual marriage would be like the non-farmers calling themselves farmers; they are either do not possess that function and/or possess an entirely different function. Even if society agreed in humoring the non-farmers by calling them farmers out of concern to not hurt their feelings because of the great status farmers enjoy in that society, they would not thereby be farmers. Likewise, gay marriage, were it allowed, would be like humoring the non-farmers by calling them farmers.
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